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Response:
Situating Ourselves in History
Steven D. Smith*
On the verge of the new millennium, the eminent historian Jacques
Barzun, possibly the most learned person then alive, observed that as the
twentieth century was winding down “[a] wider and deeper scrutiny is
needed to see that in the West the culture of the last 500 years is ending at
the same time.”1 “[T]he culture,” Barzun lamented, “is old and unraveling.”2
Over the last centuries, the West “has offered the world a set of ideas and
institutions not found earlier or elsewhere.” In developing these “ideas and
institutions,” however, the West “has pursued characteristic purposes . . .
and now these purposes . . . are bringing about its demise.”3
There is, to be sure, much to question in Barzun’s elegy, and to quarrel
with—its air of fatalism, for one thing. Arnold Toynbee, another historian
of massive erudition and morose disposition, cautioned that history, while
exhibiting discernible recurring patterns, is not ultimately deterministic.4 In
addition, it is perilous to try to discern our own place in the broad panorama
of history. With our faces pressed against the canvas, how can we see the
whole picture? Thus, the annals are replete with people who mistakenly
believed they were living on the brink of the apocalypse (and also of people
who erroneously expected to see the Millennium—the one where lions eat
grass and lie down with lambs—or some secular variant thereof).
And yet . . . looking backward, we can perceive that for all the
incorrigible unruliness of history, and all the divergent interpretations, there
have been periods about which we can say, with some assurance, that things

* Co-Executive Director for the Institutes of Law & Religion and Law & Philosophy and
Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law.
1. JACQUES BARZUN, FROM DAWN TO DECADENCE: 1500 TO THE PRESENT ix (2000).
2. Id. at xiii.
3. Id. at xv.
4. ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY: RECONSIDERATIONS 518 (1961) (asserting that
“patterns in the course of human affairs are not predetermined or inevitable”).
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were not just the usual “one damn thing after another” (as Winston Churchill
supposedly said): rather, a culture or civilization was in a condition of
decline or collapse while another and different kind of culture was emerging
(and not for better). And sometimes people living in these times of decline
had a sense of their situation. The fourth and fifth centuries in the Roman
Empire were such a period: and most students of history have not regarded
the consequences—the short term consequences, at least (“short term” in this
context meaning something like the next several centuries)—as happy ones.5
The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in Western Europe were another such
period, and again the short term consequences (“short term” now meaning a
century, give or take) were uncomfortable: the French Wars of Religion, the
Thirty Years War.6 It may be, as Barzun and others have thought,7 that we
are in the midst of another such period of major transformation, and that
there are “signs of the times” to suggest as much. If so, that fact presumably
ought to affect our interpretations of the events and trends of our own time.
I indulge in these reflections only because they may help to illuminate
the important but elusive differences between the views and interpretations
presented in my Brandeis lecture and in The Rise and Decline of American
Religious Freedom and those expressed in the comments by Professors
Koppelman, Tebbe, and Horwitz. Any author would be gratified to be
blessed with such perceptive, knowledgeable, and also charitable critics.8
Their comments raise a host of important particular questions and
challenges; I could not possibly address all or even very many of these in a

5. See, e.g., BRYAN WARD-PERKINS, THE FALL OF ROME AND THE END OF CIVILIZATION
(2005) (responding vigorously and critically to revisionist and more benign interpretations of the fall
of the Roman Empire).
6. Critics differ in their assessments of the longer-term consequences. For the most part, the
modern view has been that the change was a good one. But see BRAD GREGORY, THE UNINTENDED
REFORMATION (2012).
7. See, e.g., HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 39 (1983) (asserting that “the
historical soil of the Western legal tradition is being washed away in the twentieth century, and the
tradition itself is threatened with collapse”). A more grandiose version of this narrative of decline
came from sociologist PITIRIM SOROKIN, THE CRISIS OF OUR AGE (1941). And of course there is
OSWALD SPENGLER, THE DECLINE OF THE WEST (1918 - 1923).
8. Although critical, all three commentators are generous—more generous than I deserve, I am
afraid. And I have surely learned as much from them as they have from me. As it happens, Paul
Horwitz is not the first to describe me as a conservative or religious “crit.” I associate Critical Legal
Studies with a time when legal scholarship was more probing and alive than it has since become, and
so I humbly accept this designation—so long, that is, as I am not called upon to explain Gramsci,
Hegel, the early Marx, Derrida, or deconstruction.
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brief Response. And in any case, taking the arguments one-by-one, I am
inclined to agree with more in the comments than I disagree with. And yet it
seems clear that the commentators mean to be critical (even if respectfully
critical), and that their views and mine are far from being in alignment.
How then to explain our simultaneous agreements and divergences?
One major difference, it seems, is not so much of substance as of tone,
or perhaps attitude. Koppelman and Tebbe accept large parts of my
diagnosis of difficulties in modern religion clause jurisprudence, but they are
puzzled that I find these difficulties so worrisome.
Thus, Koppelman
admits that rejection of special protection for religious freedom has achieved
“hegemonic” status among legal academics,9 but he doubts that this view is
widely shared in the general population. Our failures on the level of theory
need not translate into lack of protection in practice; there is thus no warrant
for the “gloom”10 expressed in the book. Tebbe argues that if religious
freedom comes to lose its special status in constitutional law, religious actors
may nonetheless be almost as fully protected, or possibly even better
protected, by other constitutional rights and doctrines—free speech and
equal protection, for example.11
I can grant these points and still wonder at the easy cheerfulness of these
responses.
But different attitudes—my “gloom” and Koppelman’s
characteristic and enviable optimism, for example—may be explicable
against the backdrop of different implicit background historical narratives.12
If your implicit historical picture is of “business-as-usual,” or better yet of
reliably predictable even if uneven progress,13 then a judicial debacle or a
9. Andrew Koppelman, Theorists, Get Over Yourselves: A Response to Steven D. Smith, 41
PEPP. L. REV. 937, 938 (2014).
10. Id. at 944.
11. Nelson Tebbe, The End of Religious Freedom: What is at Stake?, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 963, 970
(2014).
12. On the influence of often implicit historical narratives, see CHRISTIAN SMITH, MORAL,
BELIEVING ANIMALS 63–94 (2003). On the importance of background as opposed to foreground
factors, see Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive
Theory, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1785 (1997).
13. Both these comments and their work in general suggest the influence on Koppelman and
Tebbe of a narrative that has been powerfully influential especially in the academy and that we
might call “the Enlightenment story.” This is a grand historical narrative that tells how, beginning
perhaps around the fifteenth century and then gathering momentum in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, something called “Reason” emerged and began to push back the darkness of
Tradition and Superstition that had prevailed since Late Antiquity. The breakthrough of Reason
portended a course of Progress in the governance of humankind: it could be anticipated that humans
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theoretical embarrassment here and there are regrettable but not especially
alarming. Win a few, lose a few. Such is life. Things may be in disarray at
the moment, but there is a good chance that next year will be better.
Conversely, if you perceive that our culture seems to be in the midst of a
major transformation, and if you also believe that a commitment to religious
freedom has been one of the defining “ideas and institutions” mentioned by
Barzun that has been central to a distinctive Western civilization that now
shows signs of “unraveling,” things look different. The erosion of that
commitment together with a “hegemonic” view among academics that the
commitment is no longer defensible may seem more momentous–
momentous in its own right and also as symptomatic of a larger and
potentially worrisome change in which the center can no longer hold.14 By
the same token, you can agree with Tebbe (as I do) that “social and political
dynamics”15 will ultimately count for more than constitutional decisions and
doctrines, and yet worry about academic and judicial developments precisely
because these are one important indicator of the direction in which such
dynamics seem to be carrying us (and also because, beyond their immediate
practical consequences, the doctrines and decisions are among the important
shapers of “social and political dynamics”).
Paul Horwitz comments explicitly on the difference in attitudes. He
would become progressively more free from want, oppression, and prejudice. On the influence of the
Enlightenment story, see Smith, supra note 12, at 71. Some might think that the horrific events of
the twentieth century would have decisively discredited this story. And yet the story is tenacious: its
central themes—reason, progress, suspicion of tradition, a propensity to classify opposition under
the heading of “prejudice”—remain pervasive, especially among those who like to call themselves,
revealingly, “progressives.”
14. Actually, even without supposing any sort of major historical transition, Koppelman’s
complacency about the consequences of academic opinion seems to me unwarranted. He notes
Keynes’ observation about the long-term consequences of ideas, Koppelman, supra note 9, at 944;
that observation seems pertinent in this context. As an analogy, the Court’s decision in Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), invalidating a law prohibiting homosexual conduct, might plausibly be
seen as ratifying the academic consensus that had come to prevail four decades earlier in association
with the celebrated Hart-Devlin debate (a debate that flourished, perhaps not coincidentally, when
Anthony Kennedy, author-to-be of the majority opinion in Lawrence, was a law student). See
ROBERT GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL 49 (1993) (observing that “[m]any, . . . perhaps even most,
think that Hart carried the day . . . “). Similarly, if it comes to be widely accepted in the legal
academy that special constitutional treatment for religion is unjustified, odds are that this consensus
sooner or later will manifest itself in positive law as well. This is a point, to be sure, about the long
term influence of academic opinion, not about the efficacy of theorizing itself: one can acknowledge
the likely force of an academic consensus even while doubting (as I do, in both of these instances)
the cogency of the theorizing that ostensibly supports that consensus.
15. Tebbe, supra note 11, at 980.
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thinks that while acknowledging the shortcomings and intermittent tragedies
of the “American settlement” that prevailed in the nineteenth- and early
twentieth-centuries, I nonetheless seem “optimistic” about the earlier
arrangement and “pessimistic” about our present situation. Horwitz,
conversely, while acknowledging current problems, would mostly reverse
these valuations: to him, “things look pretty damn good” today, at least by
contrast to earlier decades.16
As it happens, if we were just to consider, say, the years 1850 and 2000
as frozen moments extracted from the flow of history, I might be inclined to
agree with Horwitz. I pick the year 2000, not 2014: even in the last few
years, much has changed to affect and perhaps alter the comparative
assessment. And that is the point: once again, if current events are viewed
as indications of an ongoing shift to some significantly altered legal and
cultural arrangement, our judgments may change.
But then why should we suppose that we are in the midst of some
epochal transition to a very different and uncertain political future? Surely
the say-so of a few curmudgeonly prophets like Barzun is not enough to go
on (even acknowledging their erudition). Admitting that the attempt to
situate ourselves in history and to discern its larger flow is inherently
speculative, I offer four observations. These are contestable observations, to
be sure, and although I believe they could be supported (and some of them
are argued for more fully in the book), they are stated here in baldly
conclusory form for your consideration.
First, the distinctive commitment to religious freedom as we have
known it in America is to a large extent the product of Christian themes
developed and implemented in the West over centuries within the
framework of what has been, in its foundations and governing aspirations if
only erratically in its practices, a Christian civilization.17
Second, as a matter both of history and of unfolding logic, the
commitment to religious freedom has expanded or spilled over into support
for other valued and overlapping rights, conveniently if loosely clustered
around the First Amendment—freedom of conscience, freedom of thought,
freedom of speech, freedom of association.
16. Paul Horwitz, More “Vitiating Paradoxes”: A Response to Steven D. Smith, 41 PEPP L. REV.
943, 952–53 (2014).
17. This claim is argued for at greater length in chapter 1 of the book. More generally, see the
impressively erudite if oddly entitled DAVID BENTLEY HART, ATHEIST DELUSIONS: THE CHRISTIAN
REVOLUTION AND ITS FASHIONABLE ENEMIES (2009).
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Third, and consequently, the relinquishment of the distinctive
commitment to religious freedom may undermine the foundations of these
other rights as well. I understand that even someone who accepts my first
and second observations might dispute this third claim. In his Memorial
and Remonstrance, however, James Madison warned that if the right to
religious freedom is not secure, then all other rights will be likewise
imperilled.18 And more recent history offers some limited confirmation.
Thus, with the benefit of two-plus centuries of additional experience, Rajeev
Barghava reports that “states that fail to protect religious freedom usually
trample on other freedoms too.”19 (To be sure, the matter is complex:
correlation is not equivalent to causation.)
Fourth, modern judicial and academic discourse has almost wholly
detached the constitutional protection for religious freedom from its
Christian or Judeo-Christian sources and has ruled inadmissible the
supporting theological rationales. And it is far from clear that secular
substitutes can do the job. Consequently, Douglas Laycock reports that
“scholars from all points on the spectrum now question whether there is any
modern justification for religious liberty.”20 At the same time, a movement
of secular egalitarianism has arisen that is often openly antagonistic to
traditional religion and hence to the traditional commitment to religious

18. The right to religious freedom, Madison argued, “is held by the same tenure with all our
other rights. . . .”
Either, then, we must say that the will of the Legislature is the only measure of their
authority, and that in the plenitude of this authority, they may sweep away all our
fundamental rights; or, that they are bound to leave this particular right untouched and
sacred.
JAMES MADISON, A MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785),
REPRINTED IN THE SACRED RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE 309, 313 (Daniel L. Dreisbach & Mark David
Hall eds. 2009).
19. RAJEEV BHARGAVA, REHABILITATING SECULARISM, IN RETHINKING SECULARISM 99 (Craig
Calhoun et al. eds. 2011).
20. Douglas Laycock, Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 88 DETROIT-MERCY L.
REV. 407, 423 (2011). See, e.g., BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2012); Micah
Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012); Gemma
Cornelissen, Belief-Based Exemptions: Are Religious Beliefs Special?, 25 RATIO JURIS 85 (2012);
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE
CONSTITUTION (2007); Anthony Ellis, What is Special about Religion?, 25 LAW & PHIL. 219
(2006); James W. Nickel, Who Needs Freedom of Religion?, 76 COLO. L. REV. 941 (2005); Gidon
Sapir & Daniel Statman, Why Freedom of Religion Does Not Include Freedom from Religion, 24
LAW & PHIL. 467–505 (2005).
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freedom.21 As the spectacular advances of the campaign for same-sex
marriage reflect, this movement begins to look like a sort of an impatient
political juggernaut with the power to overwhelm pundits and professors and
politicians (including some politicians who never stand for election), and to
flatten both centuries-old understandings of vital institutions such as
marriage as well as long-standing procedural commitments (such as the
venerable notion that major constitutional issues ought to be decided
forthrightly and in the context of live and disputed controversies, not
through misdirection in feigned cases).22 Secular egalitarianism, like some
contemporary Spiritus Mundi, slouches toward becoming a new and
dominant secular orthodoxy,23 muscling aside the centuries-old Christian one
from which the commitment to religious freedom (and so much else24)
developed.
I submit that all of these observations are at least plausible, and that
their conjunction supports an interpretation of current developments from a
Barzunesque in contrast to either a “business-as-usual” or a “progressive”
21. See generally Laycock, supra note 20, at 412–15. See also Douglas Laycock, Religious
Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2304427.
22. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2698–700 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2674–75 (2013).
23. Writing presciently a third of a century ago, the sociologist and political theorist Robert
Nisbet observed the potential power of what he called “the New Equality.” ROBERT NISBET,
TWILIGHT OF AUTHORITY 180–93 (1975). Nisbet argued that “[e]quality has a built-in revolutionary
force lacking in such ideas as justice or liberty.”
Equality feeds on itself as no other single social value does. It is not long before it
becomes more than a value. It takes on . . . all the overtones of redemptiveness and
becomes a religious rather than a secular idea.
Id. at 184. Nisbet commented that
it would be hard to exaggerate the potential spiritual dynamic that lies in the idea of
equality at the present time. One would have to go back to certain other ages, such as
imperial Rome, in which Christianity was generated as a major historical force, or
Western Europe of the Reformation, to find a theme endowed with as much unifying,
mobilizing power, especially among intellectuals, as the idea of equality carries now.
Id. If Nisbet’s observations were broadly accurate in 1975, they seem even more apt today.
24. Cf. Hart, supra note 17, at 32–33 (“Even the most ardent secularists among us generally
cling to notions of human rights, economic and social justice, providence for the indigent, legal
equality, or basic human dignity that pre-Christian Western culture would have found not so much
foolish as unintelligible. It is simply the case that we distant children of the pagans would not be
able to believe in any of these things– they would never have occurred to us– had our ancestors not
once believed that God is love, that charity is the foundation of all virtues, that all of us are equal
before the eyes of God, that to fail to feed the hungry or care for the suffering is to sin against Christ,
and that Christ laid down his life for the least of his brethren.”).
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perspective. But I emphatically do not mean to lapse into any sort of
historical fatalism. Much remains open and undecided. The egalitarian
movement that looks so irresistible at the moment could turn out to be shortlived, as other “progressive” enthusiasms (such as eugenics, or prohibition)
have sometimes done. Current decisions adverse to Christian photographers
and bakers25 could provoke a backlash, reversing trends (and perhaps
creating new and different dangers). Religious revivals have occurred
sporadically and unpredictably throughout American history; a new but no
doubt different kind of revival might be in the offing. Any number of things
could happen.
So the future of religious freedom remains very much in the balance.
Views and conclusions will inevitably vary, as the perceptive comments by
Professors Koppelman, Tebbe, and Horwitz demonstrate. All of this is
natural and fitting. The one attitude that is not apt, I submit, is complacency.

25. See Elane Photography v. Willcock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013); Craig v. Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Inc., CR 2013-0008 (Colo. Office of Admin. Cts. 2013) (initial decision).
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